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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
B. W. McMAHON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7673

MELISSA TANNER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

The parties are referred to herein as in the court belowB. W. McMahon as Plaintiff and Melissa Tanner as Defendant.
This is an appeal by the defendant from the decision of Judge
F. W. Keller of the District Court of Carbon County. The
matter was tried without a jury.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister .. They inherited from their brother, John P. Mc11ahon, deceased, 550
acres of land in Carbon County 'vhich was sold by the plaintiff
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as administrator of said estate and with the approval of the
defendant to Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation for $25.00 per
acre. The written contract covering sale was signed on November 11th, 1948, and provided among other things that the
said corporation would resell, at $25.00 per acre, two tracts
of four acres each-one to the plaintiff and the other to the
defendant. One of said tracts ad joined the east boundary of
Earl Stevenson's Service Station on the Price-Dragerton Highway and the·other adjoining the west boundary of said station,
said tracts being designated as the East Tract and the West
Tract, respectively. Nothing was mentioned in said agreement as to which party should have the East Tract and which
the West Tract.
On or about the middle of November, 1949, one year after
said agreement was entered into, Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, through their attorney Edward W. Clyde, conveyed by
special warranty deed to the plaintiff the West Tract, and to
the defendant the East Tract. Mr. Clyde testified at the time
when the said agreement was entered into he had urged the
parties to designate to him which tract each was to receive,
but they failed to do so. Consequently, he arbitrarily assigned
the tracts to them as provided in their respective deeds. The
plaintiff received his deed to the West tract from Mr. Clyde,
examined it, and paid the purchase price therefor on or about
the 15th day of November, 1949, without asking which tract he
was purchasing. About two "'eeks later the defendant received
her deed for the East Tract and paid the purchase price therefor after being told by Mr. Clyde in answer to her inquiry that
her deed covered the East Tract.

4
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About the 15th day of April, 1950, the plaintiff, "'ho
testified that he thought his deed covered the East Tract, sold
said East Tract, \vhich was O\Yned by the defendant, to one
Iv1ario Marchino et al for $1100.00. The purchasers, without
receiving an abstract of title to the property or making inquiry
at the County Recorder's Office as to the O\vner of said property, proceeded to construct an outdoor theatre on the defendant's land. Defendant had no knowledge of said sale or construction until the 29th day of May, 1950, when she went to
Carbon County from her home in Salt Lake City for Decoration
Day ..A.t that time she saw the construction on her property
and v1as informed by the wife of the plaintiff that the theatre
being built thereon would open in two or three days.
In his pleadings, plaintiff alleged that a mistake had been
made by the grantor when the deeds were prepared and that
he should have received the East Tract. He also alleged that
an oral agreement was entered into between him and the defendant wherein it was decided that he should receive the East
Tract and the defendant the West Tract. The defendant denied
that a mistake had been made or that any agreement had ever
been entered into between the plaintiff and defendant relating
to said tracts. After the trial, the court rendered a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff on the ground that there was an agreement, and ordered defendant to deliver to the plaintiff a deed
to the East Tract in exchange for one from him for the West
Tract.
ASSIGN~1ENTS

OF ERROR

The defendant makes the following Assignments of Error:

5
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1. Plaintiff is entitled to no relief in equity because the

errors he complains of were due entirely to his own inexcusible
carelessness and negligence and could have been avoided
through the exercise of ordinary care by him.
2. If a mistake was made, it was not a mutual mistake

and is, therefore, not subject to reformation.
3. There was insufficient evidence of any agreement between the parties relating to the matter in dispute to justify
a reformation of the deeds in question.

ARGUMENT
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF IN

EQUITY BECAUSE THE ERRORS HE COMPLAINS OF
WERE DUE ENTIRELY TO HIS OWN INEXCUSIBLE
CARLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE, AND COULD HAVE
BEEN A VOIDED THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF ORDINARY CARE BY HIM.
The two deeds in question are clear, concise and legal so
that the plaintiff has no remedy in a court of law. He is asking
for a reformation of the two deeds, in an action in equity, on the
grounds that a mistake was made and that the intentions of
the parties were not carried out in said deeds.
In the case of Haggerty vs. McCanna, 25 N. J. Eq.
48, the court clearly expressed a fundamental doctrine
followed universally by court of Equity as follows:
rrAn error which is the result of inexcusible negligence
is not a nzistake from the conjequence of which equity
will grant relief.n
6
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This same principle is stated as follows by the Supren1e
Court of Oregon in the case of Wolfgang v. Henry Thiele
Catering Co., 275 P. 33:
nLack of the diligence of a prudent person precludes
the granting of relief."
This rule is stated more fully in 1 Story Eq. Jur. Paragraph
146, as quoted in 9 L. R ..A.. (n.s.) 1211.
nit is not, however, sufficient in all cas~s to give the
party relief that the fact is material, but it must be such
as he could not by reasonable diligence get know ledge
of when he was put upon inquiry; for if by such reasonable diligence, he could have obtained knowledge
of the fact, equity will not relieve him, since that would
en~ourage culpable negligence."
·

* * *
c]t is not, however, in every case of mistake even
of a material fact, that the court will grant relief,
for, if the mistake is the result of the party's carelessness or inattention the court will not interfere -in
his behalf, its policy being to adtninister relief to the
vigilant, and to put all parties upon the exercise of a
reasonable degree of diligence." Toops v. Snyder, 70
Ind., 560 as quoted in 9 L. R ....A. ( n.s.) 1211.
In order, therefore, for the plaintiff to be entitled to a
reformation of the deeds in question, it n1ust be made clear
that he exercised at least ordinary care and reasonable diligence relating to the transaction. As to this the facts are
undisputed.
On the 11th day of November, 1948, when the written
contract between Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation and the plain-
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tiff, as administrator of his brother's estate was executed, Mr.
Clyde, attorney for the corporation, testified that he repeatedly
urged the plaintiff and his sister to decide between themselves
as to which of them should receive the East Tract and which
the West Tract so that he. could put it in the contract and
know how to make out the deeds, but they failed to do so.
"Nobody instructed me," Mr. Clyde testified, ~~what
grantee to put in the deeds and I arbitrarily put her
(defendant) name on one and him (plaintiff) on the
other." (Tr. P. 55).
If an agreement had actually been entered into between
the parties on that point, the plaintiff was negligent in not so
informing Mr. Clyde so as to guard against an error, for he
was a party to the contract with the corporation. When he
failed to do so, it became especially incumbent upon him to be
on the alert for a mistake when the deeds were executed and
delivered. The exercise of ordinary diligence would certainly
have required that he at least make inquiry of Mr. Clyde at
the time he received his deed and paid for the property conveyed by it as to which tract had been conveyed to him. This
he did not do. On this point Mr. Clyde testified as follows;

Tr. P. 56-57.
Q. uDid you deliver the deed to Mr. McMahon?
A. Yes, I did.

Q. Will you state what occurred at that time?
A. It might help if I prefaced it this way, Mr. Maw.
I sent a letter to each of them telling them the deeds
were ready and in response to the letters, each of them
came to my office. He (plaintiff) came in, oh, at least
8
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a \veek or ten days before she did. I gaz'e bint biJ deed.
He loo,~ed it ot'er, be did;z't as,~ dllJ questions about it
at all. He paid me the money. and n1y recollection is that
I gave him a receipt and he ·teft, and that is all there
\Yas to it."
A mere inquiry at that time directed to Mr. Clyde by the
plaintiff as to \V hich tract had been conveyed to him, if he did
not so discover it when nhe looked it over" before he paid
for it, would have been all that \vas necessary to detern1ine
the true status of the transaction. Any prudent purchaser
would have done that. The fact that he did not do so either
raises a presumption that he knew he was purchasing the West
Tract or proves that he was very careless and negligent.
When the defendant received her deed from Mr. Clyde,
she inquired of him as to which tract she was purchasing, ·and
was informed by him that it was the East Tract, before she paid
for the land and accepted the deed.
The plaintiff's subsequent transactions relating to the
property continued to be careless and negligent. He sold the
East Tract, which he did not ov1n, without having a.n abstract
of title made or without checking with the county r~corder as
to the validity of his title to that tract. The purchaser accepted
his deed and placed constructions on the property without
checking the title. Every step in the whole procedure relating
to the property taken by the plaintiff was froth with carelessness, neglect and wanton indifference. His carelessness and
negligence were directly responsible for all of the errors complained of, and each one of thern could have been ascertained
and avoided through the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by him.

9
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That the court should not aid him under such circumstances is supported by numerous authorities, a few samples
of which are listed below.
''Equity assists only the vigilant. It does not relieve
against mistakes which ordinary care would have prevented. Conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence are necessary to call a court of equity into activity." Wirsching v. Grand Lodge etc., 56 At. 713.

* * *

HThe conclusion is that he (the Complainant) is not
entitled to relief where the evidence shows that he was
'negligent' or that he could and would have ascertained
the facts by the exercise of 'due' or 'reasonable' diligence, or where he had 'means of knowledge' or 'might
have ascertained the truth.' In other words, mistake,
to constitute equitable relief, must not be merely the
result of inattention, personal negligence, or misconduct on the part of the party applying for relief." 19
Am. Juris., 77 Par. 57.

* "A* person
*

who is possessed of his normal mental
faculties and is able to read and write, and having the
.opportunity to read the contract, but neglects and fails
to do so, cannot escape the legal effect of the written
agreement because the terms expressed therein may
be different from those agreed upon, unless the party
signing the contract is free from negligence in ascertaining the contents of the written contract at the time
he attaches his signature thereto.'' Cherokee Oil and
Gas Co., v. Lucky Leaf Oil and Gas Co. (Okla.) 242
P. 214.

* "It* is*the duty of a party to an instrument to ascertain its true meaning and purport and to understand its
contents before afixing his signature; and if he fails
10
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to discharge his duty, he is guilty of negligence which
ordinarily '"ill deprive hin1 of relief by way of reformation on the grounds of mistake. .At least he is presumptively guilty of gross negligence and the burden
of proof rests on him to rebut the presumption.'' 45
Am. Jur. 632, Par. 79.

* * *

In Hayes v. Travelers Inc. Co., 93 F. (2d) 568, it
was stated that one having the capacity and opportunity
to read an instrument, who executes it without reading
it ,or ascertaining its meaning, in the absence of fraud
or imposition or special circun1stances excusing his
failure to read it, is charged with knowledge of its
contents and cannot avoid the contract by asserting
that it did not express what he intended.''

* * *

tcEquity aids the vigilant, and will not extend its
aid, by reforming an instrument, to one who has been
guilty of culpable negligence especially when the change
might injuriously affect the rights or status of the other
party to the instrument or of an innocent third person.

Equity requires that the party who asks for relief on
the grounds 9! tnutual mistake shall have exercised at
least the degree of diligence U'hich may be fairly expected f1"om a reasonable person. Cases are, therefore,
not infrequent where relief against" mistake, by reformation, has been·. refused on the grounds that the party
complaining had within his reach the means of ascertaining the true state of facts and without being induced
thereto by the other party, neglected to avail himself
of his opportunities for information." 45 Am. Juris.,
631 Par. 78.
2. IF A MISTAKE WAS ACTUALLY ~1ADE, IT WAS

NOT A 1v1UTUAL ONE AND IS, THEREFORE, NOT SUBJECT TO REFORMATION.
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is a general rule that courts will not reform a written
agreement or instrument on the grounds of mistake unless the
mistake is a mutual one involving all of the parties. In cases
where only one of the parties was mistaken, the action should
be for recission because there was no meeting of the minds,
not for reformation. A clear statement of this rule is found
in 9 Am. Juris. 378, Par. 33.
"Moreover it is to be noticed that a deed may be
reformed or corrected in equity upon the ground of
mistake only when the mistake is mutual; if the mistake
is unilateral, the remedy is recission.''
In the instant case, three parties are involved in the exe~
cution of the deeds which t~e plaintiff seeks to reform. They
are Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, grantor in both deeds,
Plaintiff, grantee in the deed conveying the West Tract, and
defendant, grantee in the deed conveying the East Tract. The
testimony is· undisputed that Mr. Clyde, representing the
grantor, made no mistake when he prepared and delivered the
deeds in question. He decided which tract was to he sold to
each of the parties. He intended that the defendant should
receive the East Tract for he so advised her before receiving
the consideration for the sale. He also knew that the plaintiff
had purchased the West Tract. The defendant knew she was
purchasing the East Tract when she accepted delivery of the
deed. Plaintiff was the only party :who was mistaken, if any
'mistake was actually made by anyone, and his mistake was
due entirely to his own carelessness. There is no conflict in
the testimony on this point. The only remedy of the plaintiff,
therefore, is for a recission of his deed from the grantor if

12
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he so desires, and not for a reformation of the two instruments.
Authorities on this point are numerous.
((It is stated as a general rule that in order to justify the granting of relief on the ground of mistake,
the parties to the transaction must have been mutually
tnistaken, a mistake on the part of one party not being
relievable." 19 Am. Juris. 77 Par. 57.

* * *
HI£ the mistake goes to the identity of the property
itself (as. in the instant case) the instrument may be
rescinded, but not reformed, since there was no meeting
of the minds of the parties." 16 Am. Juris. 465 Par.
4~6; Page v. Higgins (Mass.) 22 N. E. 63; 5 L.R.A.
152.

* * *

((Where no question of fraud, bad faith, or inequitable conduct is involved and the right to reform an instrument is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary
that the mistake be nzutual and that both parties understood the contract as the com plaint or petition alleges
it ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for
the mistake, and this is so whether the mistake is one
of fact or one of law or one of fact and law mixed.
Otherwise stated, a unilateral mistake is not ordinarily
ground for reformation, the remedy in the case thereof
being recission." 45 Am. Juris., 617 Pa~. 55.

* * *

"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is frequently
given by a reformation of the contract. But a contract
will not be reformed for a unilateral mistake." 59
A.L.R. 809.

* * *

((As respects the reformation of instruments, the
general rule, subject to various and varying exceptions,

13
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is that equity will reform instruments for the correction
of errors when they do not conform to the intentions
of the parties, by mistake, that is to say by mutual mistake, or mistake of one party and fraud or inequitable
conduct of the other. . .. and the mistake must have
been in the drafting of the instrument not in the making
of the contract. An instrument will not be reformed
on the ground of a mere misunderstanding of facts or
a mistake as to an extrinsic fact which, if known,
would probably have induced the making of a different
contract. If there has been any misunderstanding between the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both
so their minds have not met no contract has been
entered into, and the court will not make for them a
contract which they did not make." 45 Am. Juris.
609-10, Par. 46.

* * *
3. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ANY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN RELATION
TO THE TRANSACTION TO JUSTIFY A REFOR~1ATION
OF THE DEEDS.
The court below ignored the other issues discussed herein
and based its decision on this one.
A deed is a solemn instrument. It is clothed with formalities in its execution and courts have always been reluctant
to reform them except under the n1ost extenuating circumstances, because they represent the ownership of land which is
a sacred right of all free peoples. Consequently, the courts
have universally required that evidence justifying a reform of
deeds be very strong, definite and certain. This rule is stated
clearly by the Supreme Court of Washington_ in the case of

14
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Puget Mill Co. vs. Kerry, 49 P (2d) 57, quoting from 2
Pomeroy, Equity Juris. (4th Ed.) Par. 859.
ttThe auth~rities all require that the parol evidence
of the mistake and of the alleged n1odification must be
clear and convincing-in the language of some judges,
cthe strongest possible'-or else the mistake must be
admitted by the opposite party. The resulting proof
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts
of equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation
upon a probability, nor even upon a mere preponderance
of evidence, but only upon a certainty of error."
Has the plaintiff presented evidence in support of his
contention that he and his sister made an agreement between
themselves on the matter at issue which is conclusive, is the
real question before the court.
There seems to be no doubt but what both parties preferred the West Tract on November 11th, 1948, when the plaintiff testified the alleged oral agreement "\vas supposed to have
been made. Both parties agree that they discussed the matter
in Mr. Clyde's office. Mr. Clyde testified that he asked thetn to
decide the matter between themselves. Defendant testified as
follows on this point, Tr. p. 19:
Q.

tc • • •

Which tract of land did you say you wanted?

A. I told him (Plaintiff) my choice would be on the
west side.
Q. The west side. And hoping that you would get it,
you planted trees and shrubs on the west tract, is that
correct?

A. Well, I thought that, yes.

15
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Q. And when you expressed that desire to your
brother that you wanted the west tract, what did your
brother say ?

A. He said, (That is the piece I wanted.' That is
what he \\ranted.
Q. He wanted it for himself?

A. That is right.
Q. Did he give you any reason vvhy he wanted it?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. Did he say anything about going into business
with anyone ?
A. Oh, yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said Mr. Stevenson, the garage man, and he
were going into some kind of car business. I don't
know, second hand cars. Some kind of car business."

On this point the plaintiff's testimony was in agreement
with that of the defendant. He testified as follows after the
defendant had expressed/ her preference for the West Tract
to him.
ttl said to her, (Well you chose the side, you chose the
side I wanted.' I did want the \\rest side. I wanted the
west side, a Mr. Stevenson vvas talking about putting
up a service station, not a service station but a dance
hall." Tr. 61-62.
It was this conversation that the plaintiff contends was an
agreement that he should have the East Tract and his sister
the West one. It. should be noted that at no time did the
16
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plaintiff or any other \vitness testify that plaintiff agreed that
defendant should have the West Tract or that he accepted
her offer to take the West Tract.
!he above conversation took place in Mr. C~yde's office
as he was urging the parties to get together on who should get
the two tracts, yet Plaintiff testified definitely that he did not
inform Mr. Clyde of their alleged agreement. It is inconceivable that a prudent man exercising ordinary diligence would
have failed to convey the information as to the agreement to
the one who was urging them to get together so that he might
make out the deeds properly if an agreement had been actually
entered into. This _failure to inform Mr. Clyde plus the fact
that the plaintiff at no time testified that he consented to or
acquiesced in the defendant's request that she have the West
Tract is strong evidence that there was no meeting of the
minds of the party on that issue. In view of the fact that
no other discussions of the matter were ever held between the
parties after that, it seems clear that the preponderance of the
evidence supports the defendant's declaration tha:t she and her
brother never decided between themselves as to which of thein
should get either the East or the West Tract. 1 he so-called
agreement amounted to no more than a declaration of conflicting preferences, both wanting the same tract of land, with
no evidence that they ever settled their differences.
1

Plaintiff was the administrator of his deceased brother's
estate and was a resident of Carbon County. He was well acquainted with the relative values of the two tracts of land. In
fact he testified as to the relative value of the two (Tr. P. 59)
and from his testimony it is apparent that he felt that the
17
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. West Tract was much the more valuable. It is natural that he
preferred that tract.
The evidence seems to indicate that the defendant felt
that her brother would eventually give her the piece she chose.
Sisters usually think that their brothers· will eventually give
in to their wishes. With that in mind she planted two or three
trees on the West Tract. It was not until she was in Mr. Clyde's
office to get her deed that she realized that her brother had
taken the tract she had wanted for himself. She became upset
and said that the plaintiff had ccjust tricked me again." Mr.
Clyde testified that she said, ((Well, Ben (Plaintiff) and I
agreed that he get this piece and I would get the other one,"
but it seems clear from all of the circumstances that her use
of the term ((agreed" in her conversation with Mr. Clyde was
loosely used and was more of an expression of her desires,
and of what she felt her brother would eventually do in that
matter, than a declaration that a contract had been entered
into between them. Defendant definitely denies any contractual agreemen~ with her brother on that point. Her husband,
who was with her during her discussions with Mr. Clyde,
testified that the statement made by his wife to Mr. Clyde when
she was informed that she was to get the East Tract was, ((I
thought I wa~s going to get the West parcel." His remembrance of the conversation was quite different from that of
Mr. Clyde on that issue. But regardless of what was said on that
occasion, the fact still remains that there was no testimony to
the effect that the offer of the defendant to take the West Tract
was ever accepted by the plaintiff. Without an o!Jet· and acceptance there is no binding contract.
18
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It is the contention of the defendant that plaintiff presented
no substantial proof of an agreement bet\veen the parties, on
the point at issue. The conversations between them on the
subject amounted to no more than expressions of preference.
But even if Plaintiff's evidence indicates to the court a probability of a binding agreement, surely it cannot be contended
that the evidence was strong enough to have removed reasonable doubt on the subject, for as quoted above, ccCourts of
equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation upon a
probability, nor even upon a mere preponderance of evidence,
but only upon a certainty of error."
A few of the numerous decisions of courts on this point
are referred to below:
Hit is well settled that courts of equity will enforce
parol agreements respecting the sale of lands in cases
of mistake or fraud, and in furtherance of this end
will reform deeds and other written instruments. But it
is equally well settled that a court will administer
this high equitable remedy only on a clear case. Before
a court of equity will declare such a parol ttgreenzent
creates an obligation and confers a remedial right not
within the Statutes of Frauds} it will require co gent
proof. The decisions which support this proposition
are numerous. Not only must the mistake or fraud
be so proven; the precise terms of the oral agreement
claimed must be made equally clear." Holman v. Vieira,
300 P. 946 (Nev.)

* * *

In Blue v. Blue, 116 S. E. 134 (W.Va.) 30 A. L. R.
1169, the court said: nThe principles of law applicable
to reformation of a deed because of mistake are well
settled and defined in our decisions. Where the mistake
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is clearly made out by proof, equity will reform the
deed so as to make it exactly conform to the intent of
the parties. But if the proof is doubtful, and the mis-

take is not made plain beyond reasonable controt'ersy,
the deed will not be reformed. A deed is a solemn
instrument executed with formality and imports full
and complete exposure of the intent of the parties,
requiring convincing and absolute proof of mistake
before it can be reformed or Jet ctSide. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has gone so far as to hold that it
would be an extreme case where it would reform a
written instrument upon the uncorroborated testimony
of a party thereto, even if such testimony was uncontradicted. The books are full of cases which illustrate
the extreme caution which courts exercise in such matters. Relief u'ill be denied whenever the evidence is
loose, equivocal, or cont1'adictory, or is open to doubt
or opposing presumptions."

* * *
cCWe must bear in mind the well established rule
that, in order to justify ref ortnation of a contract, the

evidence must be full, unequivocal, and convincing as to
the mistake and its rnutuality. A preponderance of evidence is not enough. The proof must establish the facts
to a moral certainty and take the case out of the range
of reasonable controversy.'' Home Insurance Co. vs.
Akers (Okla.) 221 Pac. 493.

* * *
ccThere is a direct conflict in the oral evidence upon
the issue as to an agreement respecting the sale of the
personal property subject to the lien for existing taxes.

Where any doubt exists as to the intent of the parties,
reformation U'ill not be granted." John Hancock etc.
v. Agnew (Wash.), 95 P. 2d 386.

* * *
20
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Hit is a rule so well settled as to need no citation of
sustaining authority, that a written instrument, which
constitutes the contract between two parties, will be
reformed only U'hen fraud or rnistake is shou'n by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. If as in the case
at bar the evidence is in sharp conflict or any doubt
exists as to the intent of the parties, reformation will
not be granted. Carew et al v. General Casualty Co.,
65 P. 2d 689.
CONCLUSION
Because the negligence of the plaintiff is entirely responsible for the errors from which he now seeks relief, and because
the alleged mistake was not a tnutual one and is, therefore,
not subject to reformation; and because the evidence of an
oral agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff to reform the deeds
in question was not full, clear, unequivocal and convincing,
defendant prays that the judgment of the lower court be set
aside, and that she have judgment with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT B. MAW,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant

202 Boston Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, lJtah.
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